The aim of this paper is to propose a conceptual reconstruction of Sen’s conception of individual judgments, through a back-and-forth analysis between his democratic theory of justice and social choice theory. Firstly, while this is never explicitly presented in Sen’s work, we highlight the importance of the three following elements in the characterization of judgments: position, objectivity and the sense of otherness. Once combined, these three conditions are necessary in order to characterize positional judgments, which, unlike individual preferences, are relevant for justice issues. Secondly, we identify two forces which, in Sen’s view, drive the evolution of such judgments: a widened informational basis and sentiments. This leads us to conclude that a relevant approach to communication, i.e., one which acknowledges the scope of positional judgments and the forces at the source of their evolution, is a third condition for a fruitful transformation of judgments. This last point constitutes, according to us, a missing element in Sen’s idea of justice.
- Muriel Gilardone
(Normandie Université, UCBN, CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), France)
- Antoinette Baujard
(Université de Lyon, UJM, GATE L-SE (UMR CNRS 5824), France)
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2013-03-ccr. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CODA-POIREY Hélène). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cccrmfr.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Kenneth Arrow, an American economist, is known for his contributions to mathematical economics. Educated at City College of New York and Columbia University, he has taught at Stanford and Harvard universities. He was awarded the Nobel Prize (jointly with Sir John Richard Hicks) for his work in welfare economics and the theory of social choice. The possibility of a theory of social choice, or collective choice based on the preferences of individuals has intrigued economists for some time. Arrow's Ph.D. thesis, published as Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), was the seminal work in the field of social choice theory and showed the impossibility of deriving efficient group outcomes based on the aggregate of rational individual preferences. In a later book, Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making (1986), which was coauthored with Herve Raynaud, Arrow dealt with additional decision criteria and alternatives in a search for efficient group outcomes. Despite the importance of these two works, the general reader may find them somewhat difficult and abstruse. The work of most general equilibrium economists like Arrow is seldom well known outside the economics profession. Even so, Arrow's range of interests extends far beyond the straightforward mathematical treatment of economics. For example, he is an outspoken advocate of the decontrol of oil prices.